should be introduced. It refers to both personal and non-personal data, focusing on the latter.
II. No need for exclusive rights in data
4. At present, the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition can see neither a justification nor a necessity to create exclusive rights in data.
5. There is no legal principle that rights in data must be allocated to a specific legal subject from the outset. The law on the protection of personal data does not legitimise the control (ultimately, for economic motives) over the use of data either as such or on downstream data markets. Nor should exclusive data use rights be allocated to the owners of objects that generate data by sensors (e.g. machines or everyday appliances such as vehicles or heaters).
6. Based on the current state of knowledge, there are also no economic reasons for recognising exclusive rights in data. On the contrary, this would entail the risk of interference with the freedom to conduct a business and the freedom to compete, the risk of impeding business operations of other market players who depend on access to data, and generate negative effects on the development of downstream data markets. Of critical concern would be the strengthening of existing data power and the creation of new market power derived from data, which would foster anti-competitive market entry barriers. The general principle of a public domain of free information must prevail over the imminent creation of "information monopolies". In light of the apparent dynamic development of the digital economy, no general market failure can be observed or expected. Thus, no legislative incentives for the collection or creation of data are necessary: data will be produced anyway, often as a by-product.
7. Today, even without actual exclusive rights, data is already the object of daily transactions. The firms in question usually have the technical means to shield from third parties the data produced in the course of their business operations that they deem worthy of protection. In practice, this factual exclusivity is sufMax Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition 3 von 12 ficient to grant access to data on a contractual basis. It affords effective protection inter partes and guarantees the availability of feasible courses of action for market players. In particular, each firm can retain control over "its" data and determine who is authorised to access it. Compliance with contractual obligations can be secured, for instance, by imposing a contractual penalty in the case of unauthorised disclosure of data. This way, new markets can develop without statutory exclusive rights (comparable with markets for transmission rights for sporting events). Interfering with this well-established and functioning system by means of the statutory allocation of rights in data to individuals does not promise to improve market conditions from an economic standpoint. Instead, it would pose the risk of disturbing the already functioning markets.
8. Apart from economic arguments, the enactment of exclusive rights in data would lead to a number of practical problems, which could hardly be solved adequately in the short term. First of all, it would be necessary to determine the subject-matter and the scope of protection, thus raising such complex questions as how to define the term "data". Furthermore, the legislature would have to define the entitlements and specific rights of the right holders. This would pose quite a challenge, especially, when diverse stakeholders may qualify as potential right holders. Due to the interconnected and collaborative value chain in the data-driven economy, the creation of new rights in data is likely to yield legal uncertainty. Finally, it would be difficult to balance the interests of all parties affected by such rights and delineate the scope of protection.
III. No need to adjust the sui-generis protection for databases
9. As the allocation of exclusive rights in individual data is neither necessary nor justified, the sui-generis protection of databases laid down in Art. 7 et seq. of Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases should not be expanded or reinterpreted to this effect. 11. In the course of adopting the Database Directive, it was agreed that individual database contents should not be protected. Rather, the protection of the database as such should exist regardless of the intellectual property status of individual database contents (Art. 3(2)). Nevertheless, there were legitimate concerns that the de facto protection of database elements -especially in the case of single-source information -would, in effect, amount to the protection of database contents by exclusive rights. To prevent this risk, the legislature included a threshold of substantiality for extraction (Art. 7(1)), a reporting duty for the Commission (Art. 16 (3)) and a reminder concerning the applicability of the general competition rules (cf. recital 47).
IV. No need for the special protection of algorithms

The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition does not see any
need to create special legal protection of algorithms used in data processing (e.g. in the context of big-data analysis).
13. To a great extent, technological challenges in the digital economy concern the development of tools to process collected raw data, in particular for filtering (which is understood here as a set of rules to solve a problem step by step, independent of its expression and representation, e.g. the description of the steps to be made for analysing or filtering data and the criteria to be applied). This is already implied by Recital 11 of the Directive, which clarifies that copyright protection for computer programs should not extend to the "ideas and principles which underlie any element of a program".
15.
A computer program as such also cannot be protected by a patent (Art. 
52(2)(c) and (3) EPC
V. Tortious conduct as a reference point for regulation?
18. The existing legal framework already prohibits particular forms of tortious conduct that are relevant for the data-driven economy. Such rules are known, for instance, as "regulation of fair dealing" or "regulation against unfair competition". Without creating exclusive erga omnes rights, they prohibit certain practices of market players and penalise violation through tort liability, administrative or criminal sanctions.
19. Such regulatory approach presents many advantages for a data-driven econo- all of the following requirements: a) it is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; b) it has commercial value because it is secret; c) it has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret".
23. Individual data can hardly qualify as a trade secret, especially due to the requirements of "secrecy" and "commercial value". Gathered or obtained data is often publicly available. If, for instance, potholes are automatically detected by passing cars, the same opportunity -to know where the potholes are -is available for everyone; the data generated are not absolutely "secret" to begin with.
This also raises questions regarding the commercial value of such data. Despite the impossibility of keeping a piece of data secret, the information encompassed therein could still present some value if the generation of that data entails substantial costs.
24. In general, one should also take into account that the Directive does not aim specifically at regulating the data-driven economy. Although the second recital mentions "commercial data such as information on customers and suppliers", it is doubtful whether the broad interpretation of such passages could classify all kinds of data as trade secrets in the sense of the Directive.
25. Alternatively, the regulation could focus not on individual data but on data sets. To qualify as a "secret" in the sense of the Directive, trade secrets do not have to be created ex nihilo. Freely accessible information can also constitute a part of a trade secret. For instance, some information about customers might be publicly available; however, the aggregated customer data as a whole may well 28. Should the Directive on the protection of trade secrets be inapplicable, it would be worth considering whether specific forms of protection against tortious conduct should be adopted in order to prevent interference into the entrepreneurial sphere of market players by third parties. Undertakings can remain competitive only if they possess a certain degree of autonomy in business operations. Although some Member States already provide for protection against third-party interference in undertakings' sphere of confidentiality, it might be worth considering a specific legal regime under EU law if there is no other way to achieve legal harmonisation in the internal market. Such protection should be designed so as to avoid creating disincentives for potential investors. In particular, the legal protection of undertakings' entrepreneurial sphere should neither result in exclusive rights in data as such, nor hamper legitimate access to data. The petitioner for access needs to prove that the data/information at issue is essential for the appearance of a new product or service, and that there is no other way to create or otherwise obtain it. Furthermore, the CJEU acknowledged that there might be an objective justification for the refusal to grant access. Yet the criteria and the scope of the specific requirements involved remain uncertain. In addition, it should be noted that these judgements were issued under the assumption of IP protection for the subject matter at issue; whether and how these findings can be applied to situations involving unprotected raw data is yet to be clarified. In this regard, one can assume that, in the context of a dynamic, data-driven economy, a duty to grant access under competition law could only be enforced in exceptional circumstances.
35. Indeed, the diversity and dynamic development of business models in the digital economy stand in stark contrast to the case-by-case assessment required under competition law. The fast pace of the data-driven economy pushes the applicability of competition law to its limits.
36. Data can be a source of market power, especially when (potential) market players lack the capacity to gather data themselves or otherwise gain access to them. This market power is not as such sufficient to establish abuse of market dominance, though. Moreover, the possession of market power can be easily considerations. In any case, there is a considerable need for further research with regard to the overall framework, the justifications and the concepts of regulation that are capable of realising an effective regime of access.
40. There is also a need for clarification with regard to the modalities of access, in particular the formats in which the data at issue should be made accessible. The value of data is likely to be enhanced through the interoperability of data formats and standardisation. Here, self-regulation by the involved industry players is one possibility. The Commission should encourage such self-regulation by establishing an appropriate regulatory framework. In this regard, the competition-law principles for assessing standard-setting agreements set out in the EU Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements can serve as a starting point.
